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NOTES
Evaluating Purely Reproductive Disorders Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act

Todd Lebowitz
Approximately 2.8 million American couples suffer from infer
tility,1 a condition generally defined by the medical community as
the failure to conceive after one year of unprotected intercourse.2
During the past thirty years, diagnostic and therapeutic techniques
for treating infertility have improved drastically, enabling many
previously infertile couples to bear children.3 These techniques,
however, involve considerable expense and inconvenience, fre
quently requiring patients to take time off from work.4 Disputes
with employers may follow, sometimes resulting in the infertile em
ployee's termination.5 Some terminated employees, claiming that
infertility constitutes a disability, then sue their former employers6
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("the ADA" or
"the Act").7
In enacting the ADA, Congress specifically stated the Act's pur
pose: "[T]o provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disa
bilities."8 The ADA's prohibition on disability-based discrimina1. See Luther M. Talbert, Overview of the Diagnostic Evaluation, in INFERTILITY: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE PHYSICIAN 2 (Mary G. Hammond & Luther M. Talbert eds., 3d
ed. 1992).
2. See id.; MELVIN L. TAYMOR, INFERTILITY: A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO DIAGNOSIS AND
TREATMENT 11 {1990).
3.
4.

See TAYMOR, supra note 2, at 4-5.
See id. at 107.
See, e.g., Erickson v. Board of Governors,

911 F. Supp. 316, 317-18 (N.D. Ill . 1995)
5.
{hearing the case of a plaintiff who was terminated after missing work to obtain infertility
treatment); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995) {deciding
the applicability of the ADA to a dispute involving the nonrenewal of a news anchor's con
tract after she asked for reduced work hours to accommodate her infertility treatment pro
gram), affd., 19 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393,
1396 (N.D. Ill. 1994) {hearing the case of a plaintiff who was terminated after missing work to
obtain infertility treatment).
6. See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 676-77 {8th Cir. 1996);
Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at 316; Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 240; Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1393.
7. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990),
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 {1994).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1210l{b) In addition, the Act recognizes as a national goal the assurance of
"equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-suffi
ciency" for individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a){8).
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tion in employment specifically provides: "No covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because
of the disability of such individual in regard to job application pro
cedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, em
ployee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment."9 The ADA also specifies, in a seven
part description, the types of behavior that constitute discrimina
tion against an individual with a disability.1 0
Congress failed, however, to state with the same specificity what
constitutes a disability in the first place; instead, the Act broadly
defines "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that sub
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] indi
vidual."11 Infertile individuals seeking ADA protection have
argued that their impairments constitute ADA-protected disabili
ties because they "substantially limit" the "major life activity" of
reproduction.12
The question of whether infertility fits within this broad defini
tion of disability is complicated by the fact that infertility is not al9. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(a).

10. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b). Some examples of discriminatory behavior include: segre
gating job applicants in a way that adversely affects individuals with disabilities; denying
equal employment or benefits to an individual because of a disability; failing to acco=odate
reasonably an individual's disability; and using selection criteria that tend to screen out
otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Congress adopted for the ADA the same definition of disa
bility that it used in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Fair Housing Act. See Rehabilita
tion Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 103-73, 107 Stat. 718, codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(8)(B) (1993) (defining "individual with handicaps" with language identical to the ADA
definition of disability), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat. 4348 (1992) (changing the
phrase "individuals with handicaps" to "individual with a disability"); Fair Housing Act, Pub.
L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1994) (defining
"handicap"); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990) (indicating an intent that the
ADA definition of disability be interpreted consistently with the definition of "individual
with handicaps" in the Rehabilitation Act and "handicap" in the Fair Housing Act); H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 26-27 (1990) (same); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 21 (1989) (same). As
a result, courts and co=entators alike consistently rely on Rehabilitation Act and Fair
Housing Act cases for guidance in determining what constitutes a disability under the ADA.
See, e.g., Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 725 n.4, 726 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that
the ADA "definition of 'disability' is substantially equivalent to that in the Rehabilitation
Act" and that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ADA "regulations adopt
the same definition of major life activities as used in the Rehabilitation Act"); Ennis v. Na
tional Assn. of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995) (using case law
developed under the Rehabilitation and Fair Housing Acts to interpret the term "disability"
as used in the ADA); William G. Buss, Human Immunodeficiency Vims, the Legal Meaning

of "Handicap," and Implications for Public Education Under Federal Law at the Dawn of the
Age of the ADA, 77 lowA L. REv. 1389, 1405-06 (1992); Jack P. DeSario & James D. Slack,
The Americans with Disabilities Act and Refusals to Provide Medical Care to Persons with
HIV/AIDS, 27 J . MARsHALL L. REv. 347, 353 (1994).
12. See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 676-77 (8th Cir. 1996);
Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Zatarain v. WDSU
Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995), affd., 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996);
Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
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ways a medically distinct impairment. Rather, a variety of disorders
may cause infertility, and many of these disorders affect activities
other than reproduction.13 An ovarian tumor or a sexually trans
mitted disease, for example, can cause infertility, but these condi
tions can also limit participation in other activities. An ovarian
tumor may limit a woman's ability to walk, and gonorrhea can
cause blindness.14 For purposes of this Note, disorders affecting
previously recognized "major life activities"15 and reproduction
must be distinguished from disorders that affect only reproduction.
This Note terms disorders that affect reproduction, but no other
previously recognized major life activities, as purely reproductive
disorders. This Note focuses only on the applicability of the ADA
to purely reproductive disorders.16
Courts are divided as to whether purely reproductive disorders
may constitute disabilities. Litigants generally agree that purely re
productive disorders are "impairments" that "substantially limit"
the activity of reproduction.17 The crux of the legal dispute, there
fore, is whether reproduction itself constitutes a "major life activ
ity" under the ADA. The Seventh Circuit has held that sterile
individuals may be handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 18 a statute upon which the ADA based its definition of disa
bility.19 Following this holding, district courts within that circuit
have held that infertile individuals and those with reproductive dis
orders that jeopardize a pregnancy are disabled under the ADA.
These courts have based their holdings on a finding that reproduc
tion is a major life activity.20 Other courts, in an effort to justify
13. See generally TAYMOR, supra note 2, at 21-41 (discussing various factors that contrib
ute to infertility in men and women).
14. See ToMASz F. MROCZKOWSKI, SEXUALLY 'TuANsMITIED DISEASES 41 (1990); Cheryl
L. Ivey, When Your Patient Has Ovarian Cancer, RN, Nov. 1994, at 26, 27.
15. The major life activities explicitly recognized by Congress or the Equal Opportunity
Employment Commission, or both, are as follows: caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, working, sitting, standing, lift
ing, reaching, thinking, concentrating, and interacting with others. For a discussion and brief
legal history of the recognition of these activities as major life activities under the Act, see
infra text accompanying notes 88-92.
16. This Note declines to consider reproductive disorders that affect other major life ac
tivities because these reproductive disorders are clearly covered by the ADA and are there
fore uncontroversial.
17. See infra note 27.
18. See McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 228-29 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that plain

tiff stated a cognizable claim under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701-797).

19. See supra note 11.
20.

See Soodman v. Wtldman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, No. 95-C3834, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1495, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 1997); Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp.
316, 323 (N.D. Ill . 1995); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404 (N.D. Ill .
1994).
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ADA coverage of asymptomatic HIV-positive21 individuals, have
also classified reproduction as a major life activity.22 Outside of the
Seventh Circuit, however, no court evaluating ADA coverage of
p urely reproductive disorders has classified reproduction as a major
life activity. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have both held that in
fertile individuals are not protected by the ADA because reproduc
tion is not a major life activity.23
This Note argues that purely reproductive disorders do not con
stitute disabilities under the ADA. Part I examines the statutory
language and interpretive guidelines24 that determine whether an
impairment qualifies as a disability and concludes that it would be
improper to interpret such language as covering purely reproduc
tive disorders. Part II analyzes the legislative history of the Act and
maintains that Congress did not intend to include purely reproduc
tive disorders within the definition of disability. Part III identifies
three characteristics common to all of the major life activities al
ready recognized under the ADA and argues that because repro
duction lacks these characteristics, i,t should not be recognized as a
major life activity.25 Part IV contends that victims of discrimination
may obtain relief through other, more appropriate legal avenues,
making their reliance on the ADA unnecessary.

21. "HIV" is the abbreviation for the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, which causes Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
·

22. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939-42 (1st Cir:1997); Doe v. Kohn, Nast

& Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1320-21 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F.

Supp. 559, 568 (D.D.C. 1992).
23. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996); Zatarain v.
WD SU-Television Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995), affd., 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir.
1996).

24. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), pursuant to their Congressionally delegated authority, have issued guidelines
for interpreting key terms and provisions of the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (1991)
(EEOC); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 (1991) (DOJ).
25. Although individuals with purely reproductive disorders do not suffer from an "im
pairment that substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities," they may nonetheless
be eligible for ADA protection under the Act's "second definition" or "third definition."
The ADA provides "second definition" and "third definition" ADA protection, respectively,
to individuals who have a "record of' or are "regarded as" having a disability. Such coverage
is available, however, only if the perceived disability includes, or is perceived to include, the
components of a physical or mental impairment, substantial limitation, and major life activ
ity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B), (C) (1994). As a result, an employee can be "disabled"
under the ADA's third definition if her employer regards her to be substantially limited in a
major life activity, even if, in reality, she is not limited at all. For a more complete discussion
of third definition coverage, see infra note 141. This Note will limit its analysis to whether an
individual with a purely reproductive disorder actually has a disability, that is, whether such
an individual would qualify under the first definition. Nonetheless, because the concepts of
"impairment," "substantially limits," and "major life activity" are relevant to all three defini
tions, the conclusions that follow may have the effect of limiting disability coverage under the
second and third definitions as well.
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PURELY REPRODUCTIVE DISORDERS FAIL TO MEET
ADA's THREE-PART DEFINITION OF DISABILITY

THE

To qualify for coverage under the ADA, a disorder must satisfy
the three necessary elements set out in the Act's definition of "disa
bility": (a) a "physical or mental impairment" that (b) "substan
tially limits" (c) a "major life activit[y]."26 Defendants in cases
involving infertility often concede the presence of the first two com
ponents, admitting that the plaintiffs' reproductive disorder is an
impairment that substantially limits the ability to reproduce.27 In
stead, they contest the applicability of the third component, arguing
that reproduction is not a "major life activity" under the Act.28
Some courts, however, have confused the debate by treating the
first factor, impairment, as the sole determinant of disability status.
This Part argues that courts following this approach misread the
Act.
Despite the statute's three essential components, some courts
wrongly have used the definition of "impairment" as their defini
tion of "disability," thus ignoring the statutory requirement that the
impairment "substantially limit" a "major life activity" in order to

26. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (defining a disability as "a physical or mental impair
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual"); see
also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51-52 (1990) (construing the statutory definition as
containing these three components); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990) (same); S.
REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989) (same). The EEOC, to which Congress delegated authority to
enforce Title I of the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116-12117 (1994); 28 C.F.R. § 1630.1, has also
identified these three components as essential elements of a disability. See EEOC Comp!.
Man. (CCH) § 902.1 (1993); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(g). Title I of the ADA is the portion of
the Act that specifically addresses discrimination in the employment context.
27. See, e.g., Krauel, 95 F.3d at 677; Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404
(N.D. ill. 1994).
Although the ADA does not define "impairment," Congress delegated the authority to
define this component to the administrative agencies in charge of enforcing the Act. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 12116-12117 (granting the EEOC authority to enforce Title I: Employment); 42
U.S.C. §§ 12134, 12186(b) (1994) (granting the Department of Justice authority to enforce
Title II: Public Services, part A, and Title ID: Public Accommodations and Services Oper
ated by Private Entities). These agencies have defined broadly the phrase "physical or
mental impairment" in a manner that clearly includes physiological disorders or conditions
affecting the reproductive system:
Physical or mental impairment means:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, spe
cial sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary, heroic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syn
drome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.

28 C.F.R.
28.

§

35.104 (1991) (DOJ); 28 C.F.R.

See, e.g., Krauel,

95 F3d at 677;

§ 36.104 (DOJ); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (EEOC).

Pacourek,

858 F. Supp. at 1404.
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qualify as a disability.29 In Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 3o one dis
trict court concluded that because reproductive disorders are in
cluded among impairments, it "logically follows" that reproduction
qualifies as a major life activity. "Otherwise, it would have made
no sense to include the reproductive system among the systems that
can have an ADA impairment."31
This analysis, however, is fatally flawed because it ignores criti
cal statutory language, thereby subverting Congress's intent to de
fine the scope of ADA coverage based on the severity of an
impairment rather than its type. The ADA's mechanism for limit
ing the scope of its coverage lies in the "substantially limiting" and
"major life activities" components - not in the list of examples of
conditions that satisfy the "impairment" component. Congress and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have
clearly stated that the presence of an impairment alone is not suffi
cient to merit protection under the Act.32 In recommending pas
sage of the ADA, the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee, the House Judiciary Committee, and the House Educa
tion and Labor Committee agreed that an impairment does not
constitute a disability unless its severity is such that it substantially
limits one or more "major life activities."33 For example, a person
with a "minor, trivial impairment, such as a simple infected finger is
not impaired in a major life activity."34 Similarly, the EEOC de
votes a full section of its ADA compliance manual to interpretation
of the term "substantially limiting," differentiating between impair
ments that substantially limit major life activities - and therefore
constitute "disabilities" - and those that do not.3s
By recognizing a range of impairments broader than the range
of major life activities that may be impaired, the ADA defines its
scope of protection based on the severity of an impairment, not
merely on its type.36 Correspondingly, Congress and the EEOC in29. See, e.g., McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 226-27 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The regula
tions define the protected class of handicapped individuals [under the Rehabilitation Act] to
include any person with a physiological disorder affecting the reproductive system.");
Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1404-05 (applying McWright to the ADA).
30. 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
31. 858 F. Supp. at 1404.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28
(1990); S. REP. No. l(ll-116, at 22 (1989); EEOC Comp!. Man. (CCH) § 902.4.
33. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28; S. REP.
No. 101-116, at 22.
34. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52; see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23.
35. See EEOC Comp!. Man. (CCH) § 902.4.
36. Compare Heilweil v. Mount Sinai, 32 F.3d 718 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that an asth
matic hospital employee was not disabled when her condition only prevented her from work
ing in one room) with carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 466-67 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding that an
employee with asthma was handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act, but was not "other
wise qualified") and Huber v. Howard County, 849 F. Supp. 407, 411 (D. Md. 1984) (finding
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struct that the· disability determination be made on an individual
ized basis.37 Federal appellate courts agree that Congress intended
for courts to follow this approach.38 As a result, courts generally
conduct the disability inquiry on an individualized basis, determin
ing the extent to which a particular plaintiff is limited in her major
life activities.39
The Pacourek court's approach, however, merges the first com
ponent, "impairment," with the third component, "major life activ
ity." This approach ignores both Congress's intent and the
statutory language itself, because it "would allow [plaintiffs] to
bootstrap a finding of substantial limitation of a major life activity
on to a finding of impairment."40 By defining major life activities in
terms of the plaintiff's impairment, the Pacourek court's approach
entirely collapses the definition of disability into a single impair
ment component. In doing so, the Pacourek court's analysis disre
gards the purpose of the ADA's three-component definition - to
limit the Act's protections to those whose lives are deeply affected
by their impairments, rather than including in its scope every per
son with an impairment, regardless of that impairment's severity.41
that a firefighter with asthma qualified as disabled because of his limited ability to breathe,
but was not ''.otherwise qualified"); Pridemore v. Rural Legal Aid Socy., 625 F. Supp. 1180,
1183-84 {S.D. Ohio 1985) {holding that "borderline" cerebral palsy was not a disability in
circumstances in which it interfered only slightly with the plaintiff's ability to read and speak)
with Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360, 1366-67 {D. Neb. 1993) {holding that a univer
sity student with cerebral palsy who needed a wheelchair and a personal assistant was dis
abled under the ADA).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28; S. REP.
No. 101-116, at 22. Specifically, the EEOC instructs,
The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on
the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that
impairment on the life of the individual. Some impairments may be disabling for partic
ular individuals but not for others, depending on the stage of the disease or disorder, the
presence of other impairments that combine to make the impairment disabling[,] or any
number of other factors.

29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) {1991). The EEOC also notes, however, that "[o]ther impairments,
such as IIlV infection, are inherently substantially limiting." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2{j).
38. See, e.g., Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1995) ("A physical
impairment, standing alone, is not necessarily a disability as contemplated by the ADA.");
Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933-34 {4th Cir. 1986) (stating that Congress deliberately
chose not to offer Rehabilitation Act coverage to everyone with an impairment).
39. See Rauenhorst v. United States Dept. of Transp., 95 F.3d 715, 716 {8th Cir. 1996);
Homeyer v. Stanley Turchin Assn., 91 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 1996); Ennis v. National Assn. of
Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 59-60 {4th Cir. 1995); see also School Bd. v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273, 287 (1987) (Rehabilitation Act). But see EEOC Comp!. Man. {CCH) § 902.4 (ex
plaining that some impairments are inherently substantially limiting); see also infra note 45
(discussing per se disabilities).
40. Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995), affd., 79
F3d 1143 {5th Cir. 1996); see also Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 107
(S.D. Iowa 1995), affd., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
41. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) {"Many impairments do not impact an individual's life
to the degree that they constitute disabling impairments.").
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The ADA establishes no automatic categorical relationship be
tween recognized impairments and recognized major life activities.
The Pacourek court reasons that because the EEOC lists reproduc
tive disorders as a type of impairment, it must have intended repro
duction to be considered a major life activity.42 Most of the
categories of impairment on the Congressional and EEOC lists,43
however, lack corresponding major life activities. Sickle-cell ane
mia, for example, is a hemic disorder constituting an impairment,
but the ability to produce normal-shaped blood cells is not a major
life activity. Rather, the determination as to whether an individual
with sickle cell anemia is disabled depends on the effect of that im
pairment on some other life activity, such as the ability to walk.44
The inclusion of reproductive disorders in the list of example
impairments signifies only a recognition that reproductive disorders
may be serious enough to warrant ADA protection, not an ac
knowledgment that all reproductive disorders automatically sub
stantially limit a major life activity.45 Disorders of the reproductive
system are similar to every other impairment on the EEOC list in
terms of their relationship to major life activities. Like the other
impairments, reproductive disorders may limit a whole host of ma
jor life activities.46 The simultaneous recognition of reproductive
disorders as impairments and exclusion of reproduction from every
list of recognized major life activities47 is therefore consistent with
Congressional and EEOC treatment of other impairments on their
lists and in no way suggests that Congress intended reproductive
impairments to constitute disabilities per se.

42. See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
43. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990); H.R. REP.
(1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989); see also supra note 27.
44.

No.

101-485, pt. 3, at 28

See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902.4(c) ex. 2.

45. The EEOC has recognized some impairments to be disabilities per se, but it rarely
does so, reserving this classification for impairments that are so severe that they are assumed
to substantially limit major life activities without additional proof. Examples include legal
blindness, deafness, and HlV infection. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902.4. Absent
these very rare circumstances, however, an individual's impairment must be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis to determine the extent to which it limits major life activities. See EEOC
Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902.4 (describing as "very rare instances" the impairments that are so
severe that they may constitute per se disabilities).
46. For example, an ovarian tumor may limit a woman's ability to walk, see Ivey, supra
note 14, at 28, menstrual disorders causing abnormal vaginal bleeding can interfere with
work, see Robert E. Nesse, Abnormal Vaginal Bleeding in Perimenopausal Women, AM. FAM.
PHYsrCIAN, July 1989, at 185, 185, and advanced syphilis can cause brain deterioration, mak
ing it difficult for patients to concentrate, sleep, speak, or see, see MRoczKOWSKI, supra note
14, at 197-200.
47. See supra note 15 (listing the major life activities previously recognized by Congress
or the EEOC).
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II.

THE LE G ISLATIVE HISTORY OF

THE

ADA FAILS TO

SUPPORT COVER AGE FOR PURELY
REPRODUCTIVE DISORDERS

The legislative history of the ADA does not indicate that Con
gress intended the ADA to include protection for individuals with
purely reproductive disorders. Legislators did recognize that repro
ductive disorders generally - that is, not only purely reproductive
disorders - were "impairments" that could substantially limit ma
jor life activities.48 Yet in the entirety of hearings, floor debates,
and committee reports, no legislator ever referred to any purely re
productive disorder as the type of condition that would substan
tially limit any major life activity and that therefore should qualify
under the ADA as a disability.49
Although nothing in the legislative history advocates recogniz
ing purely reproductive disorders as disabilities, the legislative his
tory does include explicit and universal recognition that all
individuals infected with IDV qualify as disabled.50 One legislative
committee expressed a belief that substantial limitations on the
ability of IDV-infected individuals to reproduce provide the basis
for universal coverage of IDV, thereby implying that reproduction
is a major life activity.51 The courts that have recognized infertility
as a disability have relied heavily on these comments about IDV as
support for their conclusion that reproduction constitutes a major
life activity.52
Section II.A asserts that it is improper to extrapolate from ADA
coverage of IDV-positive individuals that the ADA also covers in
dividuals with purely reproductive disorders. In fact, as section II.B
points out, legislators consciously excluded reproduction from their
48. See H.R.REP. No.
No. 101-116, at 22.

101-485, pt. 2, at 51; H.R.REP.

No.

101-485, pt.3, at 28; S. REP.

49. On the contrary, the only legislator who even mentioned a purely reproductive disor
der said that the ADAshould not be construed to grant automatic disability status to people
infected with sexually transmitted diseases. See 136 CoNG. REc. E1774 (May 24, 1990)
(statement of Rep.Craig) (noting with disapproval that anyone with a sexually transmitted
disease would be disabled under the ADAif procreation and intimate sexual relations were
major life activities).
50. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 52; H.R.REP. No. 101-485, pt.3, at 28 n.18; S.
REP. No. 101-116, at 22; see also infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
51. See H.R.REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 52 ("As noted by (a 1988 Department of Justice
memorandum ] ... a person infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus is covered
under the first ... definition of the term 'disability' because of a substantial limitation to
procreation and intimate sexual relationships."); cf. H.R.REP. No. 101-485, pt.3, at 28 n.18
(citing the same memorandum for its conclusion that HIV-infected individuals are protected,
but omitting the language about procreation and intimate sexual activity); S. REP. No. 101116, at 22 ("[A] person infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus is covered under
the first prong of the definition of the term 'disability.' ").
52. See Pacourek v.Inland Steel Co., 916 F.Supp.797, 802-03 (N.D.Ill. 1996); Erickson v.
Board of Governors, 911 F.Supp.316, 323 (N.D.Ill . 1995).

Note - Reproductive Disorders

December 1997]

733

lists of sample major life activities, an omission that provides strong
support for the inference that Congress did not intend reproduction
to be considered a major life activity.
A.

The Basis for ADA Protection of HIV-Positive Individuals
Does Not Support ADA Coverage of Purely
Reproductive Disorders

Congress and the administrative agencies charged with enforc
ing the ADA have unanimously accepted that the ADA protects all
IDV-positive individuals. Unambiguous statements in Senate and
House Committee Reports,s3 as well as numerous statements made
during debate on the fioor,s4 demonstrate a widespread under
standing throughout Congress that all IDV-positive individuals
would be individuals with disabilities under the ADA. Based on
this understanding, the administrative agencies charged with en
forcing the ADA all consider IDV-infected individuals to be indi
viduals with disabilities.ss
Despite the widespread agreement that the Act considers all
IDV-infected individuals as individuals with disabilities, there is
some dispute as to the proper basis for that conclusion. This section
describes and evaluates two independent bases that have been of
fered to explain ADA coverage of all IDV-positive individuals.
Section II.A.1 considers and rejects the view that the ADA covers
IDV-positive individuals because IIlV limits reproduction, which is
53. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (concluding that HIV-positive individuals are
disabled under first definition (citing Memorandum from Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assis
tant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Arthur B. Culverhouse, Jr., Counsel to
the President (Sept. 27, 1988), 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA), No. 641, 405:1 [hereinafter
Kmiec Memorandum])); H.R. REP. No.101-485, pt. 3, at 28 n.18 (same); S.REP. No. 101-116,
at 22 (same).
54. See, e.g., 136 CoNG. REc. S9696 (July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 136
CoNG. REc. H4621 (July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer) ("[W]ith the adoption of
this act we are instantaneously going to bring within the definition of disabled person . . .
every HIV carrier in America, every person with AIDS. "); 136 CoNG. REc. H2626 (May 22,
1990) (statement of Rep. McDermott); 136 CONG. REc. 10872 (statement of Rep. Weiss)
(May 17, 1990) ("Once the ADA becomes law, all persons with HIV disease will finally be
protected in private employment."); 135 CONG. REc. 19812-13 (Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of
Sen. Cranston) ("[T]his bill covers individuals with AIDS and individuals who are infected
with the HIV virus
[P]eople with AIDS and those who are infected with the virus are
covered under the first prong of the definition of disability as people with impairments that
substantially limit major life activities.").
.

•

.

.

55. The EEOC instructs that disability status generally should be determined on a case
by-case basis. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902.4(c)(1) (1993). Some impairments,
however, are so inherently disabling that they constitute per se disabilities. HIV infection,
the EEOC concludes, is "inherently substantially limiting." EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH)
§ 902.4(c)(1); see also Federal Contract Compliance Manual App. 6D, 8 Fair Empl. Prac.
Man. (BNA) No. 770, at 405:351, as amended Nov. 21, 1994 (Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs); Letter from Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Serv
ices, to Hon. Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives (May 1, 1990), in 136
CoNG. REc. S9539 (July 11, 1990) (Health and Human Services); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1996)
(DOJ).
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a major life activity. Section II.A.2 argues that Congress instead
adopted what can be called the one-disease view, which justifies
ADA coverage on the basis that the full course of HIV, from infec
tion to the onset and development of AIDS, is one disease that in
evitably and invariably affects nonreproductive major life activities.
Tiris section concludes that ADA coverage of HIV fails to support
the claim that reproduction is a major life activity.
1.

Limitations on Reproduction Fail to Explain ADA
Coverage of All HIV-Positive Individuals

IIlV does not affect the reproductive capabilities of every in
fected individual. Therefore, the belief that the ADA covers HIV
positive individuals because HIV limits their reproductive capabili
ties is improper. Tiris "substantially limits reproduction" view is
based on a statement in a 1988 Department of Justice memorandum
which offered the first authoritative legal opinion that HIV infec
tion constituted a disability at all.56 Written shortly after the
Supreme Court's decision in School Board v. Arline,51 the memo
randum sought to answer a question left expressly unanswered by
the Supreme Court: whether IIlV-infected individuals meet the
Rehabilitation Act's definition of an "individual with handicaps. "58
Acting Assistant Attorney General Douglas Kmiec concluded that
all IIlV-positive individuals, symptomatic and asymptomatic, qual
ify as "handicapped individuals."59 In reaching his conclusion,
.Kmiec noted that HIV-positive individuals face substantial limita
tions on their ability to reproduce and to engage in intimate sexual
relations.60
Although Congress adopted the Kmiec Memorandum's conclu
sion that IIlV-positive individuals are individuals wiith disabilities
under the Rehabilitation Act,61 the legislative history of the ADA
indicates that Congress did not support the memorandum's analysis
as a proper explanation for extending ADA coverage to all HIV
positive individuals. First, only one Congressional committee re
port, that of the House Committee on Education and Labor, relied
56. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 53, at 405:1-2.
57. 480 U.S. 273 {1987).
58. See 480 U.S. at 282 n.7 ("(We] do not reach the questions whether a carrier of a
contagious disease such as AIDS could be considered to have a physical impairment, or
whether such person could be considered, solely on the basis of contagiousness, a handi
capped person as defined by the (Rehabilitation] Act.").
59. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 53, at 405:11. The Americans with Disabilities
Act uses as its definition of "disability" the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "handicapped."
See supra note 11.
60. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 53, at 405:6-7. Kmiec also asserted that "[t]here
is little doubt that procreation is a major life activity." Id. at 405:7. This additional assertion
has not been universally accepted, however. See infra text accompanying notes 62-67, 72-75.
61. See supra notes 53-54.
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on Kmiec's underlying analysis as support for universal coverage of
HIV.62 Viewed in the context of the committee report as a whole,
however, the manner in which the committee cited the Memoran
dum suggests support only for the concept of universal HIV cover
age, and not for the idea that reproduction is a major life activity.
Furthermore, a· mere two sentences prior to the Kmiec reference,
the committee provided a list of activities that qualify as major life
activities.63 Reproduction is absent from that list.64 Had the com
mittee truly intended to adopt Kmiec's analysis, it would have in
cluded reproduction as a major life activity. It simply does not
make sense to conclude that the committee sincerely intended re
production to be considered a major life activity when it failed to
include reproduction in its list of illustrative major life activities just
two sentences earlier.
Second, although the House Committee on the Judiciary and
the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources both cite
the Kmiec Memorandum, they do so only for its conclusion, making
no reference to reproduction as a major life activity.65 These com
mittee reports also exclude reproduction from their lists of major
life activities.
Third, if Congress intended universal HIV coverage to be based
on limitations to reproduction, there likely would have been addi
tional discussion on the floor or in committee reports on other re
productive disorders that the ADA would automatically classify as
disabilities. In the entirety of legislative floor debates and commit
tee reports, there was no discussion of the ADA's intended effect
on any purely reproductive disorders. There is no evidence that
Congress ever contemplated that the ADA would classify individu
als with purely reproductive disorders as disabled.
The most compelling evidence, however, that Congress did not
intend reproductive limitations to provide the justification for uni
versal HIV coverage is that this justification cannot fully explain
universal HIV coverage. HIV infection does not affect the activity
of reproduction for every HIV-positive individual. Significant num
bers of HIV-positive individuals are unable to reproduce regardless
of their HIV status. For example, surgically sterilized individuals
who later contract HIV incur no reproductive limitations as a result
62. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990) ("As noted by [a 1988 DOJ memorandum] ... a person infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus is covered under the
first . . . definition of the term 'disability' because of a substantial limitation to procreation
and intimate sexual relationships. "); cf. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 n.18 (citing the
same memorandum for its conclusion that HIV-infected individuals are protected but omit
ting the language about procreation and intimate sexual activity); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22.
63.

See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52.
REP. No. 101-485, pt 2, at 52.
65. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 n.18 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989).
64. See H.R.
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of the infection. Similarly, postmenopausal women who contract
HIV face no additional reproductive limitations as a result of HIV
infection.66 Like those who have been surgically sterilized, they are
unable to reproduce for reasons wholly unrelated to the disease.
Nonetheless, Congress has expressed unambiguously its intent that
all HIV-positive individuals be considered disabled under the Act.67
Consequently, the dual assertions that HIV substantially limits re
production and that reproduction is a major life activity cannot sat
isfactorily explain universal ADA coverage of HIV-infected
individuals.
Another argument that should not be overlooked is that HIV is
primarily a disorder of the immune system and does not necessarily
limit the physical ability to reproduce at all. HIV-positive individu
als often choose not to reproduce because of the risk that HIV will
be transmitted to the child or that pregnancy may trigger or acceler
ate the onset of a more active stage of AIDS.68 Nonetheless, many
individuals with HIV can reproduce, and many who do reproduce
will have children who are HIV-negative.69 The fact that some
HIV-positive individuals can and do reproduce indicates that HIV
infection does not necessarily substantially limit its carriers' ability
to reproduce. To the extent that HIV infection does not limit the
reproductive capabilities, limitations on reproduction cannot be the
reason why all HIV-positive individuals are considered disabled.
2.

Only the One-Disease Theory Adequately
Explains Universal HIV Coverage

Universal coverage of HIV-positive individuals, including those
whose HIV status does not affect their reproductive capabilities, is
better explained by what can be called the one-disease theory. Ac
cording to the one-disease theory, HIV infection is the initial stage
of a long-term disease that cannot be neatly compartmentalized
into discrete periods but that clearly affects a broad spectrum of
major life activities as it develops into full-blown AIDS. In a 1988
letter to the Department of Justice, Surgeon General C. Everett
Koop called HIV infection "the starting point of a single disease
66. See, e.g., Robert W. Stock, When Older Women Get HIV, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1997,
at Cl (observing that more than 2,500 cases of AIDS in women age sixty and older have been
reported to the Centers for Disease Control).
67.

See supra

68.

See Buss, supra

notes 53-55.
note 11, at 1423-24, 1425 n.203.

69. See id. at 1423-24 (stating that only one in three babies born to HIV-positive women
will be born with the virus). For further analysis of whether the psychological aversion to
sexual activity resulting from fear of spreading the virus can be considered "substantially
limiting," see id. at 1421-28.
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which progresses through a variable range of stages."70 As it pro
gresses toward full-blown AIDS, HIV invariably limits almost all of
the explicitly recognized major life activities.11 The one-disease
theory not only represents the prevailing view of the medical com
munity ,12 but also represents the approach of the Presidential Com
mission on HIV73 as well as the predominant view among the
legislators who passed the ADA.74 Various courts have followed
this lead and have adopted the one-disease explanation as well.75
The one-disease theory is also more consistent with the ADA's
antidiscriminatory purpose. Because AIDS is a progressive disease,
HIV infection will at some point substantially limit major life activi
ties, even though it may not be known when that will occur - or,
once it has occurred, when it began.76 Because there is no clear
demarcation indicating the onset of the inevitable substantially lim
iting stage of the disease, it is unrealistic to attempt to differentiate
between the disabling and predisabling stages of the disease.77 In
deed, any attempt to differentiate may actually permit discrimina
tion against infected individuals before the onset of the
substantially limiting stage. If the ADA did not protect all HIV 
positive individuals at all stages of the disease, for example, an em70. Letter from C. Everett Koop, M. D., Surgeon General, to Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting
Assistant Attorney General [hereinafter Koop Letter], in Kmiec Memorandum, supra note
53, at 405:19.
71. See Buss, supra note 11, at 1410, 1420-21, 1428.
72. See Buss, supra note 11, at 1398 (citing support from the Institute of Medicine and the
Presidential Commission on HIV); Koop Letter, supra note 70, at 405:19.
73. See REPORT OF TIIB PRESIDENITAL CoMMISSION ON TIIB ffiV EPIDEMIC at xvii (June
24, 1988) (calling for a "full course " focus not isolating any one stage of the disease); see also
Buss, supra note 11, at 1401 n.68.
74. See 136 CoNG. REc. S9696 (July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) {"People with
mv disease are individuals who have any condition along the full spectrum of mv infection
- asymptomatic IDV infection, symptomatic IDV infection or full-blown AIDS. These indi
viduals are covered under the first prong of the definition of disability in the A DA . . . .
Although the major life activity that is affected at any point in the spectrum by the mv
infection may be different, there is a substantial limitation of some major life activity from
the onset of IDV infection."); 136 CoNG. REc. H4626 (July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Waxman) ("As medical knowledge has increased, specialists in the field increasingly recog
nize that there exists a continuum of disease among those who are IDV infected. All such
individuals are covered under the first prong of the definition of disability in the A DA."); see
also 136 CoNG. REc. H4623 (July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Owens); 136 CoNG. REc.
11,453-54 (May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Mc Dermott).
75. See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941F.2d 1495, 1502 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that scientists
consider AIDS to be a "continuum of disease"); cf. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915
F. Supp. 102, 107 n3 (S. D. Iowa 1995) (noting that the reasons for granting disability status
to IDV are distinguishable from the reasons for protecting purely reproductive disorders
because IDV can limit many of the acknowledged major life activities), affd., 95 F.3d 674 (8th
Cir. 1996); Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808 F.
Supp. 120, 132 (N. D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that prejudice against IDV-positive individuals cur
tails their ability to perform a variety of major life activities).
76. See Buss, supra note 11, at 1419-20.
77. See id.
·
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ployer might be encouraged to discriminate against an HIV-positive
employee in the early stages of the disease - before the HIV
progressed to the point at which it would substantially limit major
life activities.78 By protecting all HIV-positive individuals at all
stages of the disease, the ADA avoids creating such an incentive for
employers to discriminate in the early stages of HIV, before it is
"too late." As a result, HIV-positive individuals at any stage of the
disease should be treated as sharing the characteristics of those with
more clinically advanced AIDS and, accordingly, as having an im
pairment that substantially limits major life activities.
The one-disease theory, therefore, provides the soundest and
most well-supported explanation for Congress's clear intent that the
ADA cover as disabled all HIV-positive individuals. Only under
the one-disease theory does every HIV-positive individual, sympto
matic and asymptomatic, sterile and fertile, meet the Act's defini
tion of disability.79
B.

Congress Excluded Reproduction from the
List of Major Life Activities

More conclusive evidence of legislative intent can be found in
the lists of illustrative major life activities created by the House
Committee on the Judiciary, the House Committee on Education
and Labor, and the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Re
sources. Each of these three committees failed to include reproduc
tion in its list of illustrative major life activities.80 The interpretive
guidelines of both the EEOC and the Department of Justice also
omit reproduction from their lists of major life activities.81
Although none of these lists of major life activities purports to
be exhaustive, the failure to include reproduction is not likely to
have been mere oversight. First, legislative references to the Kmiec
memorandum at least raise the possibility that some members of
Congress believed that the ADA's coverage of HIV stemmed from
limitations on reproduction.82 In light of these references in the
78.

See id. at 1420.

79. Although asymptomatic sterilized or postmenopausal individuals with HIV might
meet the ADA's second or third definitions of disability, legislators agreed that all HIV
infected individuals are covered under the ADA's first definition of disability. See H.R. REP.
No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 n.18 (1990); S. REP. No.
101-116, at 22 (1989); supra notes 53-55.
80. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22; cf. H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (excluding reproduction from its list of major life activities but also citing
the Kmiec Memorandum's statement that limitations on procreation qualify HIV as a
disability).
81.

See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1996) (DOJ); 29 C. F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1996) (EEOC).

82. See supra note 51. At a minimum, legislative references to the Kmiec Memorandum
indicate that legislators were familiar with the Memorandum and its analysis, even if they
chose to adopt only the Memorandum's conclusion.
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legislative history, the decisions of the various Congressional com
mittees, the EEOC, and the Department of Justice to exclude re
production from their lists of major life activities provide powerful
evidence that any push to include reproduction as an acknowledged
major life activity was a minority effort. Second, Congress, the
EEOC, and the Department of Justice clearly contemplated the
role of reproductive disorders in the Act's definitional scheme be
cause reproductive disorders are included in every list of sample
impairments.83 Had Congress intended to include reproduction
among major life activities, it certainly had the opportunity to do
so. The inclusion of reproductive disorders among impairments
and the simultaneous exclusion of reproduction as a named major
life activity strongly suggest that Congress did not intend reproduc
tion to constitute a major life activity. Finally, the only legislator
even to address the role of purely reproductive disorders under the
ADA concluded that such disorders should not constitute auto
matic disabilities.84 The only conclusion that can be drawn from the
part of the legislative history that suggests that some members of
Congress believed reproduction to be a major life activity is that
some members of Congress believed reproduction to be a major life
activity.85
ill.

REPRODUCTION
OF

LACKS

THE

D EFINING CHARACTERISTICS

A MAfoR LIFE ACTIVITY

Neither the ADA itself nor the EEOC's interpretive guidelines
define the phrase "major life activity." Instead, the EEOC merely
offers examples of functions that constitute major life activities, fur
ther cautioning that this list is not exhaustive.86 Additionally, the
EEOC provides only vague guidelines for determining whether an
unlisted activity should qualify.87 This Part examines the statutory
and administrative guidelines that define which types of activities
constitute "major life activities" and concludes that reproduction
falls outside these guidelines. Section ID.A argues that three char
acteristics - microfrequency, macrofrequency, and universality are common to all previously recognized major life activities and
should be explicitly recognized as necessary elements of a major life
activity. Section ID.B concludes that in terms of microfrequency,
83. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28; S. REP.
No. 101-116, at 22; 28 C. F .R. § 36.104 (1996) (DOJ); 29 C. F.R. § 1630.2(h)(l) (EEOC).

84. See supra note 49.
85. See Krauel v.Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 107 (S.D. Iowa 1995), atfd.,
95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
86. 29 C. F.R. app.

§ 1630.2(i).

87. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i) (describing "major life activities " in terms of "basic
activities that the average person in the general population can perform with little or no
difficulty ").
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macrofrequency, and universality, reproduction is qualitatively dif
ferent from previously recognized major life activities. As a result,
reproduction cannot be considered a major life activity under the
ADA. Purely reproductive disorders, therefore, do not substan
tially limit a major life activity and are not disabilities under the
ADA.
A.

The Frequency-Universality Test Identifies Three Necessary
Elements of a Major Life Activity

Although no clear statutory or administrative mandate defines
the necessary components of a major life activity, the EEOC has
provided some guidance by expressly recognizing sixteen activities
as major life activities. Nine of these activities are codified in the
federal regulations, four appear in the appendix to the codified reg
ulations, and three appear in the EEOC Compliance Manual. Ac
cording to federal regulations, major life activities include
"functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work
ing."88 This codified list matches the lists of major life activities
promulgated in the House and Senate Committee Reports recom
mending passage of the bill.89 In an appendix to this list, the EEOC
also includes sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching among major life
activities.90 Although not codified with the other examples, the
EEOC Compliance Manual lists "[m]ental and emotional processes
such as thinking, concentrating, and interacting with others" as ad
ditional examples of major life activities.91 Courts have also recog
nized these additional activities as major life activities.92 The only
other guidance offered by the EEOC is the general statement that
major life activities are "those basic activities that the average per88. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
89. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28
(1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989). Tue House Committee on Education and Labor
also included "participation in community activities" in its list. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2,
at 52 (1990). Although this specific language is not included in the EEOC Regulations codi
fied in Title 29, the EEOC Compliance Manual does recognize "interacting with others" as a
major life activity. EEOC Comp!. Man. (CCH) § 902.3(b) (1993).
90. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i).
91. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902.3(b).
92. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Southern Co. Servs., No. CV-94-N-0475-S, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6020, at *18 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 1995) (declining to hold as a matter of law that
concentrating is not a major life activity); Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v.
Village of Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 132 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that interaction with
others is a major life activity); Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 730 (S.D. Ill.
1989) (same); Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (same).
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son in the general population can perform with little or no
difficulty. "93
Although neither the EEO C nor Congress provides criteria nec
essary for identifying a major life activity, the major life activities
they have already recognized share three common characteristics.
Explicit recognition of these characteristics as necessary compo
nents of a major life activity would provide the courts with much
needed guidance, limiting conflicts among jurisdictions and provid
ing increased predictability in ADA enforcement. As a result, this
Note advocates the express recognition of the following three
element Frequency-Universality Test.94 To merit consideration as a
major life activity under this test, an activity must be performed:
(1) with microfrequency: repeatedly throughout the day, if the
activity is brief in duration, or for a large portion of the day, if the
activity is of longer duration;
(2) with

macrofrequency:

every day or nearly every day;95 and

93. 29 C.F.R app. § 1630.2(i). This Note will refer to this instruction as the little
standard.

difficulty

94. The elements of this test are adapted from the decisions in Krauel v. Iowa Methodist
Medical Center, 915 F. Supp. 102, 106-07 (S.D. Iowa 1995), affd., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996),
and Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995), affd., 79 F.3d
1143 (5th Cir. 1996). The test tightens the "throughout the day, day in and day out" language
from these decisions and recasts them in terms of microfrequency and macrofrequency. The
universality element is adapted from a footnote in Krauel that observes: "Some people
choose not to have children, but all people care for themselves, perform manual tasks, walk,
see, hear, breathe, learn, and work, unless a handicap or illness prevents them from doing
so." Kraue� 915 F. Supp. at 106 n.1.
95. "Nearly every day" means nearly every day, not three or four times a week. "Nearly"
is used only to acknowledge that there may be unusual or rare circumstances in which some
one without an impairment would not perform a major life activity for a day. For example,
the fact that someone without an impairment might choose not to speak for one full day
would not foreclose a showing of macrofrequency.
One commentator argued against the adoption of a frequency criterion, claiming,
"Although it is certainly true that most people engage in the activities of walking and breath
ing more frequently than they engage in reproduction, the same cannot be said of other
activities on the list, such as manual tasks or caring for others." Katie Cook Morgan, Com
ment, Should Infertility Be a Covered Disability Under the ADA?: A Question for Congress,
Not the Courts, 65 CIN. L. REv. 963, 981 (1997). The argument that most people reproduce
more frequently than they perform manual tasks or care for others may be true in some
brothels but certainly nowhere else. "Manual taks," by definition, include any tasks per
formed with the hands. Without question, people not disabled use their hands many times
throughout the day, every day. "Manual tasks," by definition, include any tasks performed
with the hands. Without question, people not disabled use their hands many times through
out the day, every day. "Caring for others" is not even an enumerated major life activity.
The author apparently confuses this activity with the enumerated major life activities of "car
ing for oneself' and "interacting with others." It would strain credibility to argue that people
do not care for themselves or interact with others repeatedly throughout the day, every day
or nearly every day.
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(3) universally: by nearly all persons, except those who are pre
vented from performing the activity by an AD A-defined
"impairment. "96
All of the sixteen previously recognized major life activities with the exception of "working," which is discussed immediately
below - satisfy these three threshold criteria. This Note does not
address whether these three criteria are sufficient for qualification
as a major life activity. This Note merely argues that the three ele
ments of the Frequency-Universality Test are necessary prerequi
sites for qualification as a major life activity.
Working does not fit the Frequency-Universality Test, but Con
gress and the EEOC have clearly indicated their intent that work
ing be treated differently from the other major life activities.
Unlike their treatment of the other listed activities, Congress and
the EEOC have established specific criteria for courts to consider in
determining whether an impairment substantially limits the activity
of working.97 Congress and the EEOC specifically call for courts, to
evaluate separately limitations on working because these limita
tions are inherently more difficult to define.98 Congress further
96. Again, "nearly" is used to acknowledge that there are rare and unusual circumstances
in which some people would not participate in a major life activity on a certain day. For
example, someone hiking alone in the mountains might not speak for a day, or a prisoner tied
down might not stand for a day. However, these events are irrelevant in terms of the ADA's
purpose of providing legal protection to disabled individuals who are denied equal participa·
tion in American society. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a){2), (7), {8) {1994) (identifying as impe
tuses to passage of the ADA Congress's findings that "society has tended to isolate and
segregate individuals with disabilities," that discrimination against individuals with disabili
ties denies them the ability to "participate in, and contribute to, society," and that "the Na
tion's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities" include the assurance of "full
participation" in society); see also 136 CoNG. REc. 10,872 {May 17, 1990) (remarks of Rep.
Weiss) {"The ADA . . . is long overdue legislation remedying the separatism which now
excludes 43 million disabled citizens from equal participation in American society."). This
statutory purpose presupposes that the individuals the Act aims to protect engage in a certain
minimal level of normal social interaction. Tue existence of a few extreme or unusual
counterfactual examples of people isolated from society will not foreclose a showing of
universality, precisely because neither the Act nor the universality element is meant to pro
tect individuals isolated from the general population.
Interpretive guidance provided by the EEOC supports the use of a "nearly all people"
standard instead of a standard purporting to account for "all people." Tue little difficulty
standard advises, " 'Major life activities' are those basic activities that the average person in
the general population can perform with little or no difficulty." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i)
{1996) (emphasis added).
97. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20){3); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20); EEOC Compl. Man. {CCH)
§ 902.4(c) {1995); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt 3, at 29 {1990). Tue EEOC instructs that "the
determination of whether a person's impairment is substantially limiting should first address
major life activities other than working." EEOC Compl. Man. {CCH) § 902.4{c). For exam
ple, if an individual's arthritis substantially limits that person's ability to walk (as compared
to the average person in the general population), then the person is substantially limited in
the major life activity of walking. Tue court should consider whether the arthritis substan
tially limits the person's ability to work only if it is unclear whether the arthritis is severe
enough to substantially limit walking or other major life activities. See EEOC Compl. Man.
{CCH) § 902.4(c).
98. See EEOC Compl. Man. {CCH)

§ 902.4{c); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29.
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evinced its intent to provide special protection to those who partici
pate in the activity of working by enacting Title I of the ADA,
which specifically targets discrimination in employment.99 None of
the other fifteen recognized major life activities is given such
unique and explicit emphasis in the ADA, and each of these re
maining fifteen recognized major life. actitjties are performed
microfrequently, macrofreque;ntly, and universally.
Although no jurisdiction has explicitly adopted this Frequency
Universality Test, numerous courts have employed its elements in
making determinations regarding ADA coverage.100 These courts
have refused to recognize as a major life activity any function that
lacks any of the three components of the test. For example, courts
have held that participation in recreational sports is not a major life
activity.1°1 Participation in sports fails the test because not all peo
ple participate in sports. Although some people - professional
athletes, for example - may participate in sports for a large por
tion of the day, every day, participation in sports must fail the
universality test because unimpaired people commonly choose not
to participate in sports.102 Similarly, air travel has been held not to
constitute a major life activity because people do not engage in air
travel with the same frequency or universality with which they en
gage in the expressly recognized major life activities.103 Like partic
ipation in sports, air travel fails the test.
99. See H.R. REP
.No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 31 (stating that Title I provides a "critical protec
tion" against job discrimination).
100.

See infra notes 101-05.

101. See, e.g., Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996); Scharff v.
Frank, 791 F. Supp. 182, 184-85 (S.D. Ohio "1991) (holdit}g, without further analysis, that
"[t]he plaintiff's inability to engage in competitive sporting events and other unusually de
manding physical activities did not constitute a substantial impairment of the plaintiff's major
life activities"). Some courts have held, however, that the inability to participate in inter
scholastic sports can limit substantially the major life activity of learning. See Pahulu v. Uni
versity of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1393 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that interscholastic sports
can involve learning how to a be part of a team, but that the plaintiff's inability to play on the
team did not substantially limit his ability to learn because a myriad of educational opportu
nities remained available at the plaintiff's college); Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic
Assn., 863 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1994). The fact that interscholastic sports are not per
formed by everybody every day means only that interscholastic sports cannot constitute a
major life activity per se; the courts that have considered the inability to participate in inter
scholastic sports a disability have done so only when they have also concluded that the inabil
ity to participate substantially limited the plaintiff's ability to learn in general. See, e.g.,
Sandison, 863 F. Supp. at 489 (finding that because participation on the track team helped
the plaintiff retain the discipline he needed in order to study more effectively in school, the
plaintiff's inability to participate substantially limited his ability to learn).
102. See Knapp, 101 F.3d 473, 480 (pointing out that universality is absent, as "[n]ot eve
ryone gets to go to college, let alone play intercollegiate sports").
103. See Schultz v. Spraylat Corp., 866 F. Supp. 1535, 1538 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (interpreting
"major life activity" under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act to exclude air
travel because of its infrequency in comparison with the commonness of breathing, which is a
major life activity). California's Fair Employment and Housing Act defines disability and
major life activity in substantially the same terms as the ADA. See CAL. Govr. ConE
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On the other hand, courts uniformly have accepted sleep as a
major life activity.104 Sleep satisfies all three elements. It satisfies
the microfrequency element because it is performed for several
hours a day; the macrofrequency element because it is performed
every day - or at least nearly every day, if we acknowledge the
occasional all-nighter; and the universality element because it is
performed by all people. Similarly, courts have found eating to be a
major life activity.10 5 Eating satisfies the microfrequency element
because it is performed repeatedly throughout the day; the
macrofrequency element because it is performed every day or
nearly every day; and the universality element because it is per
formed by all people.
B.

Reproduction Lacks the Necessary Characteristics
of a Major Life Activity

lbis section considers three approaches courts have taken in
evaluating reproduction as a purported major life activity and ex
amines how these approaches relate to the Frequency-Universality
Test. As section ID.B.1 elaborates, some courts implicitly have
adopted all three components of the test as minimally necessary cri
teria for a major life activity and have concluded that reproduction
does not satisfy these criteria. Other courts, described in section
m.B.2, implicitly have adopted the frequency components106 of the
test and have attempted to redefine reproduction in terms of more
frequent events like ovulation and sperm production so that it
meets the microfrequency and macrofrequency criteria. Finally,
section III.B.3 explains how some courts have rejected the fre
quency components as too narrowly drawn, instead holding that re
production should be a major life activity because of its
momentousness as a lifetime event. lbis section concludes that
only the first of these three approaches preserves the proper mean
ing of the statute.
§ 12926(k)(l) (West 1994) (defining disability); CAL. CODE REos. tit. 2,
fining major life activity).

§ 7293.6 (1994) (de

104. See Mendez v. Gearan, No. C 95-4075, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1594, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 13, 1997) (considering frequency and universality by describing sleep as "integral to the
average person's daily existence"); Coghlan v. HJ. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 814 (N.D.
Tex. 1994) (stating, in denying summary judgment for defendant, that "[p]laintiff's disease
affect[s] such major life activities as . . . sleeping"); see also Pritchard v. Southern Co. Servs.,
No. CV-94-N-0475-S, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6020, at *18 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 1995) (holding
that the ADA list does not preclude inclusion of sleep as a major life activity).
. • •

105. See, e.g., Coghlan, 851 F. Supp. at 814 (stating without explanation that eating and
sleeping are major life activities); Weiler v. Household Fm. Corp., No. 93 C 6454, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7825, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 1994) (same).
106. The "frequency components" are microfrequency and macrofrequency. These
courts were silent as to the universality element.
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Judicial Approach 1: Adopt the Frequency and
Universality Criteria and Reject Reproduction
as a Major Life Activity

Courts in at least two jurisdictions implicitly have applied the
criteria of the Frequency-Universality Test to reject reproduction as
a major life activity.107 Only this approach effectively preserves the
language of the statute without judicially enlarging the scope of a
"major life activity" as set forth by Congress and the EEOC. Like
air travel or participation in sports, reproduction is an activity quali
tatively different from the other activities on the EEOC list. In
sharp contrast to the frequency with which people care for them
selves, perform manual tasks, walk, see, hear, speak, breathe, and
learn, reproduction does not occur every day or nearly every day,
nor repeatedly throughout the day or for a large portion of the
day.1os Most individuals who reproduce do so only a few times in
their lives; the human gestation period places physical restraints on
the frequency with which people can reproduce. Absent a multiple
birth, a person simply cannot reproduce on more than one or two
occasions per year. A far cry from "nearly every day," a full nine
months must pass between complete and successful reproductive
ventures.1°9 Noting the infrequency of reproduction relative to the
previously recognized major life activities, the court in Krauel v.
Iowa Methodist Medical Center observed that "a person is not
called upon to reproduce throughout the day, every day."110 In
fact, most courts that have found reproduction to be a major life
activity have conceded that reproduction lacks the frequency ele
ments that help comprise the test. They instead justify classification
of reproduction as a major life activity by rejecting the test.111
107. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 106-07 & n.1 (S.D. Iowa
1995) (applying the frequency components by pointing out that people do not reproduce
"throughout the day, day in and day out "; also applying the universality component by con
trasting reproduction, an activity in which some people choose not to engage, with walking,
seeing, and other activities, which are performed by all unimpaired people), affd., 95 F.3d 674
{8th Cir. 1996); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995)
{applying the frequency components by pointing out that, unlike the frequency with which
people participate in previously recognized major life activities, people do not reproduce
"throughout the day, day in and day out "), affd., 79 F.3d 1143 {5th Cir. 1996).
108.

See Kraue� 915 F. Supp. at 106-07

& n.1;

Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243.

109. A successful reproductive venture, of course, must include a birth. The length of the
gestation period requires the passage of approximately nine months between births. There
fore, the activity of reproduction cannot be completed more frequently than once every nine
months or so.
110.

Kraue� 915 F. Supp. at 106 (quoting Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243).

111. See infra section III.B.3 {describing the approach of courts that reject the frequency
criteria and embrace reproduction as a major life activity). But cf. section III.B.2 (describing
the approach of courts that adopt the frequency criteria but attempt to redefine reproduction
in terms of more frequent events so that reproduction fits within the frequency criteria).
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Reproduction also fails to satisfy the universality component of
the test. Unlike every illustrative major life activity set forth by
Congress and the EEOC,112 reproduction is a lifestyle choice be
cause many people consciously decline to participate in this activity,
even though they have no impairment that prevents their participa
tion. In contrast, activities that are performed universally are per
formed by nearly all people, unless an impairment prevents their
participation.
Some courts that classify reproduction as a major life activity
reject the notion that reproduction is a lifestyle choice. Instead,
these courts call reproduction "an integral part of life," noting that
without it, "none of us, nor any living thing, would exist."113 This
argument, though it may have a certain sentimental appeal, ignores
the common elements shared by previously recognized major life
activities. All members of society care for themselves, perform
manual tasks, walk, see, hear, speak, breathe, and learn unless an
impairment prevents them from doing so.114 Many people, on the
other hand, choose not to have children, despite having the capabil
ity to reproduce in a healthy manner.
Another court held that to call reproduction a lifestyle choice
was nothing more than an exercise in semantics because certain
other major life activities - speaking, for example - are choices as
well.115 It is certainly true that some of the previously recognized
major life activities have a volitional element, but it is also irrele
vant. The argument that reproduction is a lifestyle choice does not
fail merely because other recognized major life activities are voli
tional. There is still a universe of difference between the number of
people that speak and the number that reproduce. Speaking is an
activity engaged in by all or nearly all people, unless an impairment
prevents them from doing so. Unlike the other previously recog
nized majc;>r life activities, many people capable of reproducing sim
ply choose not to reproduce.116 The difference is qualitative, not
merely quantitative. The previously recognized major life activities
share the characteristic of being performed by nearly every
unimpaired person on the planet. The activity of reproduction does
not share that quality.
Not only is reproduction a lifestyle choice that many people
consciously decline, but · those who attempt or desire it often en112. Working, to which Congress gave special attention, is a unique, rather than an illustrative, example of a major life activity. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
113. Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 804 (N.D. III. 1996).
114. See Kraue� 915 F. Supp. at 106-07 & n.1.
115. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 941 (1st Cir. 1997).
116. See Kraue� 915 F. Supp. at 106 n.1 ("Some people choose not to have children, but
all people [perform the other recognized major life activities].").
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counter significant difficulties. According to the interpretive guide
lines to the ADA, "'major life activities' are those basic activities
that the average person in the general population can perform with
little or no difficulty."117 It can hardly be said that the average per
son in the general population can reproduce with little or no diffi
culty; many people are too young to reproduce, and many women
are too old. Age, however, is not an automatic physical impedi
ment to performing any of the major life activities the EEOC has
explicitly recognized. The fact that a significant number of people
are physically incapable of reproducing makes reproduction differ
ent from every previously acknowledged major life activity. F ur
ther, many people are neither too young nor too old to reproduce,
but lack a partner.118 Finally, many people who have a partner fail
to reproduce when they have heterosexual intercourse simply be
cause of the odds against conception, even by a male and female
with no reproductive impairments.119 Because it fails both the
Frequency-Universality Test and the little difficulty standard, repro
duction lacks the characteristics common to the other major life ac
tivities, and judges therefore should not add it to the list.
2.

Judicial Approach 2: Adopt the Frequency Components,
and Try to Make Reproduction Fit

Some courts classifying reproduction as a major life activity
have not rejected the frequency components embraced by the test;
rather they have attempted to squeeze the square peg of reproduc
tion into the round holes of micro- and macrofrequency by redefin
ing reproduction in terms of more frequent events.12° Courts in
jurisdictions following this "redefining" approach have dealt with
the frequency component by contending that reproduction should
not be viewed in terms of conception and childbirth alone. Rather,
they argue, reproduction should be evaluated in terms of "the
processes that occur continually in both male and female reproduc117. 29 C.F.R. app.

§ 1630.2(i) (1991).

118. Artificial insemination may solve this problem, but this complicated and expensive
ordeal can hardly be characterized as something the
"average person in the general popula'
tion" can do "with little or no difficulty."
119. The monthly fecundity (conception rate) in normal couples ranges from approxi
mately 20 to 25 percent. See Talbert, supra note 1, at 2. The conception rate is even lower in
the first several months after use of oral contraception ceases. See id.
One commentator argued that reproduction is an activity that "most persons in society
can perform without difficulty" because "only 7.9% of the population of persons of reproduc
tive age have difficulty reproducing." Morgan, supra note 95, at 981 & n. 123. Drawing such
a conclusion from this statistic ignores the statistic's critical qualifier, "of reproductive age."
Morgan's conclusion is unpersuasive because it fails to consider the fact that many people are
either too young or too old to reproduce.
120. See Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 322 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
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tive systems in order to achieve conception. "121 The continual
processes which allow reproduction include sperm production, ovu
lation, and various hormonal changes.
This Note contends that reproduction begins with conception
and culminates at birth. These are the defining elements of the ac
tivity, for unless both conception and birth occur, there can be no
reproduction, and until the process of reproduction begins, there
can be no conception and no birth. Several courts agree that this is
the correct conceptualization.122 A broader notion of reproduction
is inappropriate because instead of truly satisfying the test, it simply
begs the question. Redefining reproduction in terms of sperm pro
duction, ovulation, and other related processes merely identifies po
tential areas of impairment, not major life activities. For example,
in order for infrequent ovulation or impaired sperm production,
which are ·undeniably "impairments" under the EEOC defini
tion,123 to qualify as disabilities, they must still limit a major life
activity.124 Infrequent ovulation and impaired sperm production
limit no major life activities, however - unless either reproduction
is a major life activity or sperm production and ovulation by them
selves are major life activities.
Using such a broad definition, reproduction might indeed satisfy
the frequency components. Sperm production does occur through
out the day, every day. The courts adopting this definition, how
ever, ignore the equally important universality element, which
undermines their position. Sperm production and ovulation fail the
universality component of the test because all of these reproductive
functions are unique to either males or females. Not one of the
sixteen previously recognized major life activities are unique to one
sex; on the contrary, every previously recognized major life activity
is performed by everyone, or nearly everyone, regardless of sex.125
It makes no sense to consider something a major life activity if half
the population, or more, is precluded from ever performing it.126
121.

Erickson,

911 F. Supp. at 322.

122. See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 106 (S.D. Iowa 1995)
(describing reproduction as a "lifestyle choice" and an activity not performed with significant
frequency, descriptions inconsistent with the notion that reproduction consists of involuntary
bodily processes), affd., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881
F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995) (describing reproduction as less frequent than the recog
nized major life activities), affd., 19 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996).
123. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1991) (defining the impairment component of the three
component definition of disability).
124. See generally supra Part I; see also supra note 45 (explaining the infrequency with
which impairments are labeled per se disabilities).
125.

See supra

note 15.

126. Critics may argue that sperm production and ovulation are parallel processes which
might be labeled "gamete production." Grouping these processes under one label is not only
inappropriate, but also does not change the fact that neither process passes the universality
test.
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Furthermore, a broad definition of reproduction is incompatible
with the ADA's concept of a major life activity vis-a-vis its role in
the ADA's three-part definition of disability. If the definition of
reproduction were so broad as to include all the processes that lead
to conception and childbirth, then to classify reproduction as a ma
jor life activity would be to classify ovulation and sperm production
by themselves as major life activities. Such a result would mean
that a finding of disability would follow from the existence of only
the first component of the three-component disability test - a re
sult that would destroy the distinction between impairments and
major life activities that the statute clearly seeks to preserve.121
It is true, of course, that some courts have found these processes
to constitute major life activities.128 Their analysis, however, lacks
credibility because they have made this determination after consid
ering only the "impairment" component of the definition of disabil
ity, rather than considering "impairment" as only one of three
necessary components.129
The fact that male and female reproductive processes require entirely different organs,
yield different products (eggs or sperm), and are unique and exclusive to half the population
makes them different from every other previously recognized major life' activity. Major life
activities such as seeing, breathing, and speaking are performed in exactly the same manner
and through the use of the same body parts by each sex. Such a significant and obvious
difference between gamete production and all other major life activities raises serious ques
tions as to the validity of such a reclassification. No previously recognized major life activity
attempts to group under one label activities with such significant distinctions.
Nonetheless, even if male and female reproductive processes were grouped together,
gamete production would still fail the universality test. At best, males and females as a group
only engage in gamete production for a limited part of their lives. Neither males nor females
engage in such processes before puberty, and although men may produce sperm for the dura
tion of their lives, women undergo menopause, leaving them unable to engage in these repro
ductive processes for half of their lives or more. Even if one were to accept the idea of
"gamete production" as an activity not unique to either sex, a significant number of people
will be unable to perform it {because of their age), despite the fact that no impairment pre
vents performance. As a result, even gamete production cannot be classified as an activity
performed by nearly all people. No other major life activity is possible for only a limited
period during an individual's lifetime.

See supra Part I.
See, e.g., Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 322 (N.D. ill. 1995).
129. For example, in Erickson the court purported to consider the components of "im
pairment" and "major life activity" separately. The Erickson court based its conclusion that
reproduction is a major life activity on the fact that McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222 {7th
Cir. 1992), found infertility to be a "handicap" under the Rehabilitation Act. See Erickson,
911 F. Supp. at 322 (using the McWright court's analysis to support a claim that reproduction
is a major life activity). The McWright court, however, adopted as its definition of "individ
127.
128.

ual with handicaps" the definition of "impairment," failing to consider the "major life activ
ity" prong at all. See McWright, 982 F.2d at 226-27. Erickson cites McWright for the
proposition that " 'the protected class of handicapped individuals . . . include[s] any person
with a physiological disorder affecting the reproductive system.' " Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at
322 (quoting McWright, 982 F.2d at 226-27). The Erickson court even concedes that the Mc
Wright opinion failed to analyze explicitly the major life activity component, but the Erickson
court then hypothesizes that McWright must have contemplated that component. See Erick
son, 911 F. Supp. at 322. The McWright court should have contemplated the major life activ
ity component, but it did not. McWright reduced the definition of a "handicap" to the single
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Judicial Approach 3: Reject the Frequency Criteria,
Accept Reproduction as a Major Life Activity

Some courts that have found reproduction to be a major life
activity have rejected the frequency components offered in the
Frequency-Universality Test, finding that neither the ADA nor its
regulations overtly establish such criteria.130 They hold that the fre
quency components too narrowly define "major life activity." In
stead, they extend the definition of "major life activity" to include
activities that are less frequent but "momentous" or a "fundamen
tal aspect[ ] of human life."131 The criticism these courts direct to
ward the frequency components of the Frequency-Universality Test,
however, is more effectively directed at their own notion of a major
life activity. It is true that nowhere in the ADA or its interpretive
guidelines did Congress or the EEOC explicitly instruct that
microfrequency and macrofrequency are necessary elements of a
major life activity. It is equally true, however, that nowhere in the
ADA or its interpretive guidelines is there any hint that infrequent
but "momentous" or "significant" events constitute major life activ
ities either. In fact, the only guidance Congress and the EEOC
have provided - the illustrative lists and the little-difficulty stan
dard132 - suggests that infrequent but momentous events are not
major life activities. Not a single one of the illustrative major life
activities can be described as infrequent but momentous. On the
other hand, every illustrative major life activity approved by Con
gress or the EEOC is performed microfrequently - repeatedly
throughout the day or for a large portion of the day - and
macrofrequently - every day or nearly every day. The inclusion of
a "momentous ·event" category in the notion of a "major life activ
ity" is nothing more than a judicial expansion of the law. Not only
is momentousness a criterion inconsistent with every major life accomponent of an "impairment." See McWright, 983 F.2d at 226-27. The McWright decision is
entirely devoid of any "major life activity" analysis; the opinion does not even contain the
phrase "major life activity." As a result, the Erickson court's reliance on McWright to sup
port the conclusion that reproductive processes are major life activities is unpersuasive.
130. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 940-41 (1st Cir. 1997); Soodman v.
Wiidman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, No. 95-C-3834, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1495, at *16-*17
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 1997).
131. E.g., Lally v. Co=onwealth Edison Co., No. 95-C-4220, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19386, at *34-*35 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 1996) ("The definition of major life activity should be
construed broadly to include not only those activities necessary for daily existence, but also
those actions which are momentous and fundamental aspects of human life."); Pacourek v.
Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 804 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (citing the "momentousness" of repro
duction, calling it "one of life's most significant moments"); see also Abbott, 107 F.3d at 941
("Reproduction
constitutes a major life activity because of its singular importance to
those who engage in it.").
.

•

.

132. See supra text accompanying notes 88-93
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tivity previously recognized by Congress or the EEOC, it is also
hopelessly vague as a standard to apply to specific activities.133
IV.

OTHER

STATUTES PROVIDE MORE APPROPRIATE
MEANS

OF RELIEF

Any attempt to classify reproduction as a major life activity
under the ADA strains the language of the Act and distorts its
meaning. Not only is such a strain inappropriate, but it is also un
necessary. Courts that have classified purely reproductive disorders
as disabilities under the ADA undoubtedly were motivated by the
laudable desire to allow relief for plaintiffs suffering discrimination
relating to a reproductive disorder. As this Part elaborates, how
ever, another means of relief for victims of reproductive discrimina
tion already exists in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).134
The PDA, a 1978 amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, provides a more appropriate avenue for remedying dis
crimination against women with reproductive disorders. The PDA
declares that discrimination "because of or on the basis of preg
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions" constitutes sex
based discrimination in violation of Title 'VII.135 The Supreme
Court has held that discrimination based on the potential for preg
nancy also constitutes sex discrimination under the PDA.136 Lower
courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead, holding specifically
that purely reproductive disorders constitute "related medical con
ditions" under the language of the PDA.137
Moreover, interpreting the PDA to cover discrimination against
women with reproductive disorders most clearly effectuates its pur
pose. In enacting the PDA, Congress sought to prohibit discrimina133. One commentator advances the similarly flawed argument that reproduction must
be a major life activity because it has been deemed a fundamental right. See Morgan, supra
note 95, at 982 ("Refusing to recognize reproduction as a major life activity is difficult to
reconcile with the courts' long history of recognizing reproduction as a fundamental right.").
The characterization of an activity as a fundamental right has no relationship whatsoever to
whether the activity meets the ADA definition of a major life activity. Morgan's argument is
unpersuasive for the same reasons that the "momentousness" argument is unpersuasive. See
supra text accompanying notes 130-32.
134. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 stat. 2076, codified at 42 U.S.C.
135. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e(k)

§ 2000e

(1994).

(1994).

136. See International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement
Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991).
137. See, e.g., Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1402-03 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(holding that infertility is a "medical condition related to pregnancy and childbirth for pur
poses of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act"); Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp.
316, 319 (N.D. Ill . 1995) (holding that infertility is a pregnancy-related condition afforded
protection under the PDA). But see Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679-80
(8th Cir. 1996) (holding that infertility is not a "related medical condition" because it pre
vents conception, unlike pregnancy and childbirth which occur after conception).
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tion on the basis of a woman's ability to become pregnant.138 One
would expect claims of discrimination against infertile women to
arise most often when infertile women seek treatment for their con
dition. Discriminating against a female employee for seeking to
correct an infertility problem is discriminating against that em
ployee for trying to become pregnant.139 Courts are unlikely to in
terpret the PDA in a way that would allow this type of
discrimination.140
Finally, the remedies and procedures available under the PDA
are the same as those available under the ADA.141 As a result, a
plaintiff who chooses to pursue relief under the PDA rather than
the ADA forfeits nothing in terms of potential remedies and in
stead bases her demand for relief upon a statute more appropriately
tailored to remedying reproductive discrimination.
CONCLUSION

In defining disability, the ADA limits its scope to those impair
ments which substantially limit a major life activity. Congress and
the administrative agencies charged with enforcing the Act have de
fined impairments expressly to include reproductive disorders. Re
production, however, is conspicuously absent from the lists of
illustrative major life activities. Although some members of Con138.
139.

See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 211.
See Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at 320.

140. Another potential avenue of relief may be available under the ADA's third defini
tion of disability. Under the third definition, if an individual with a reproductive disorder is
"regarded as" unable to work or perform other major life activities as a result of the disorder,
a court may find that individual entitled to relief, even if the individual seeking relief is not
actually limited in any major life activities at all. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994); see also
EEOC Comp!. Man. (CCH) § 902.8 (1993). The third definition protects persons whose im
pairments are substantially limiting only as the result of the attitudes of others toward their
impairment. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 53 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989);
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(1) (1991); EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902.8(a). The third defini
tion disability is purely subjective. The defendant employer need not even know whether the
plaintiff actually has the condition, or whether the condition he regards the plaintiff as having
would qualify as a disability under the ADA's first definition. So long as the employer "re
gards" the employee as disabled, the employee meets the ADA's third definition. According
to EEOC regulations, an individual is "disabled" under the ADA's third definition of disabil
ity when that individual: "(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substan
tially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity (e.g., an employer] as
constituting such limitation; (2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (3)
Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h) (1) or (2) of this section but is treated
by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(/).
Qualification under the third definition, however, depends on the specific facts of the case.
One employer may perceive infertility as substantially limiting certain major life activities
while another employer may perceive no limitations at all. See EEOC Comp!. Man. (CCH)
§ 902.8(a).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994) (mandating that the powers, remedies, and proce
dures set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 be the powers, remedies, and procedures
provided under the ADA).
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gress apparently believed ADA coverage of asyi;nptomatic HIV
positive individuals to be based on limitations in reproduction, a
more thorough analysis of the reasons why the ADA covers asymp
tomatic individuals with HIV reveals that limitations on reproduc
tive capabilities do not form the basis for ADA coverage. F urther,
the legislative history of the ADA provides no support for the prop
osition that purely reproductive disorders should be covered under
the ADA.
Without a clear statutory basis or other Congressional mandate
to include reproduction as a major life activity, substantial consider
ation ought to be given to the reasons Congress may have excluded
reproduction from the list of illustrative major life activities. First,
Congress intended to limit the definition of disability rather than
provide coverage to every individual with an impairment.142 Sec
ond, reproduction is qualitatively different from the major life ac
tivities expressly acknowledged by Congress and the administrative
agencies in charge of enforcing the Act.143
All of the major life activities previously recognized by Con
gress and the EEOC possess three characteristics: microfrequency,
macrofrequency, and universality. These three characteristics
should be recognized explicitly as necessary components of a major
life activity under the ADA. Because reproduction lacks all three
of these elements, it would distort the meaning of the ADA to
classify reproduction as a major life activity. Expanding the scope
of "major life activities" to include reproduction would be a con
scious expansion of the law by the courts. Such a judicial expansion
of the scope of major life activities would violate both the language
of the ADA and congressional intent.

142. See supra Part I.
143. See supra Part III.

